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The secularism of post-secularity:
religion, realism, and the revival of
grand theory in IR
ADRIAN PABST*
Abstract. How to theorise religion in International Relations (IR)? Does the concept of post-
secularity advance the debate on religion beyond the ‘return of religion’ and the crisis of secular
reason? This article argues that the post-secular remains trapped in the logic of secularism.
First, a new account is provided of the ‘secularist bias’ that characterises mainstream IR
theory: (a) defining religion in either essentialist or epiphenomenal terms; (b) positing a series
of ‘antagonistic binary opposites’ such as the secular versus the religious; and (c) de-sacralising
and re-sacralising the public square. The article then analyses post-secularity, showing that
it subordinates faith under secular reason and sacralises the ‘other’ by elevating difference
into the sole transcendental term. Theorists of the post-secular such as Ju¨rgen Habermas or
William Connolly also equate secular modernity with metaphysical universalism, which they
seek to replace with post-metaphysical pluralism. In contrast, the alternative that this article
outlines is an international theory that develops the Christian realism of the English School in
the direction of a metaphysical-political realism. Such a realism binds together reason with
faith and envisions a ‘corporate’ association of peoples and nations beyond the secularist
settlement of Westphalia that is centred on national states and transnational markets. By link-
ing immanent values to transcendent principles, this approach can rethink religion in inter-
national affairs and help revive grand theory in IR.
Adrian Pabst is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of Kent. He is the author of Metaphysics:
The Creation of Hierarchy (2012) and the editor of The Crisis of Global Capitalism. Pope Benedict
XVI’s Social Encyclical and the Future of Political Economy (2011). He is currently writing The
Postliberal Alternative, a book on alternatives to the logic of left/right and state/market that has
been dominant since the secular settlement of the French Revolution.
I. Introduction
For twenty years or so, the study of international relations has been confronted with
the global resurgence of religion that challenges the dominant logic of secularism in
mainstream International Relations (IR) theory.1 In response, IR scholarship has
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1 Recent surveys of the growing IR literature on the global religious resurgence include Jeffrey Haynes,
‘Religion and International Relations in the 21st Century: Conflict or Co-operation?’, Third World
Quarterly, 27:3 (2006), pp. 535–41; Eva Bellin, ‘Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religion
and Politics’, World Politics, 60:2 (2008), pp. 315–47, esp. 315–19 and 338–47; Daniel Philpott, ‘Has
attempted to accommodate the role of faith in international affairs either within
existing IR traditions or in terms of new paradigms such as the ‘clash of [religiously
rooted] civilizations’.2 New concepts in other disciplines such as sociology and polit-
ical theory have also attracted attention in IR. Sociological research on desecularisa-
tion explores the revival of religion in international relations against the premises and
predictions of the secularisation thesis.3 Amid the crisis of secular reason, the notion
of post-secularity developed by Ju¨rgen Habermas and William Connolly suggests
that the moral intuitions of faith should be part of public discourse and be allowed
to contribute to the common good.4 As such, the nascent ‘turn to religion’ rejects
the ‘secularist bias’ of conventional IR theories and disputes the normative claims
of an immanentist analytical framework that has prevailed in the modern humanities
and social sciences since the positivist passage from revelation via metaphysics to
science.5 Thus IR may move from a secularist to a post-secularist phase in which
world religions are central to political debate and academic analysis alike.
However, this article argues that the concept of post-secularity does not advance
attempts to theorise religion in IR because it remains trapped in the logic of secularism.
First, the article revisits the ‘secularist bias’ of mainstream IR theory. By contrast
with existing interpretations, my contention is that secularism is not confined to the
public settlement of the relationship between religion and politics or the functional
differentiation of religious from political authority. Rather, the secular rests on three
elements that also inform the post-secular: defining religion in either essentialist or
epiphenomenal terms; positing a dualistic logic that underpins ‘antagonistic bipolar
opposites’ (Roland Bleiker); de-sacralising and re-sacralising the public square by
investing the secular space with quasi-sacred significance.
Second, post-secularity fails to overcome the hegemony of secular reason. Rational-
ity so configured rejects religious faith as irrational and is predicated on the separation
of natural immanence from supernatural transcendence. As a result, only secular reason
is ultimately permitted to define the procedural and majoritarian norms that govern the
public square (Habermas). Other conceptions of the post-secular rest on an immanent
the Study of Global Politics Found Religion?’, American Review of Political Science, 12 (2009), pp. 183–
202. On the secularist assumptions of mainstream IR theory, see Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and
Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997); Daniel Philpott,
‘The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations’, World Politics, 55:1 (2002),
pp. 66–95; Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 1–45, 134–54; Erin K. Wilson, After Secularism: Rethinking
Religion in Global Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 1–90.
2 For a useful discussion of how religion might fit into existing IR traditions, see Jack Snyder, ‘Introduc-
tion’, in J. Snyder (ed.), Religion and International Relations Theory (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2011), pp. 1–23. On combining several IR theories, see in the same volume, Daniel H. Nexon,
‘Religion and International Relations: No Leap of Faith Required’, pp. 141–67; in contrast, see Bellin,
‘Faith in Politics’, esp. p. 316. On ‘new paradigms’, see, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
3 Peter Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999); see also Adrian Pabst, ‘The Paradox of Faith: Religion beyond Seculariza-
tion and Desecularization’, in Craig Calhoun and Georgi M. Derlugian (eds), The Deepening Crisis:
Governance Challenges after Neoliberalism (New York: New York University Press, 2011), pp. 157–82.
4 Mariano Barbato and Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Towards a Post-secular Political Order?’, European Political
Science Review, 1:3 (2009), pp. 317–40.
5 On positivism in IR theory, see Morton A. Kaplan, ‘The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science
in International Relations’, World Politics, 19:1 (1966), pp. 1–20; Klaus E. Knorr and James N. Rosenau
(eds), Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); Chris
Brown, Understanding International Relations (2nd edn, Houndmills: Macmillan, 2001), pp. 1–42; Fred
Dallmayr, ‘Post-Secularity and (Global) Politics: A Need for Radical Redefinition’, this Special Issue.
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philosophy of difference (Connolly) that is residually transcendental. That is because
it elevates alterity into the sole transcendental term, which sacralises the ‘other’. Both
accounts of post-secularity foreclose the possibility of substantive, plural unity and a
shared commitment to the common good on which polities depend both nationally
and globally for genuinely peaceful coexistence and human flourishing.
Third, the article suggests that neither secularism nor post-secularity can rethink
religion in international affairs because both bracket metaphysics out of the picture
and accordingly separate immanent values from transcendent principles. Bound up
with this immanentist ontology are a number of assertions about the nature of ‘reality’,
our knowledge of it and the kinds of things that ‘make the world hang together’ (John
Ruggie), including religious beliefs that translate into transnational bonds. Thus, the
shared post-metaphysical outlook of both secularism and post-secularity precludes a
proper theorising of religion and the revival of grand theory in IR.
Fourth, the alternative that this article outlines is an international theory, which
develops the Christian realism of the English School in the direction of a meta-
physical-political realism. The latter differs fundamentally from the realist school in
IR because it rejects the primacy of national states and transnational markets in
favour of a ‘corporate’ association of peoples and nations in which religiously framed
ideas and practices are central.
Drawing in part on the foundations of the English School, I argue that metaphysical-
political realism shifts the focus away from methodology and narrow debates towards
first-order principles and questions of substance. In charting a conceptual map and
suggesting a number of avenues, the article focuses on three areas: first, linking inter-
national theory to metaphysical ideas; second, synthesising reason and faith; and
third, envisioning a ‘corporate’ association that rests on a relational ontology beyond
the dichotomy of the states-based ontology connected with international society and
the individual-based ontology associated with world society or world community.
II. Secularism and IR theory
The role of religion in international affairs has not so much been neglected and over-
looked as misrepresented and under-theorised. Even during the heyday of the secu-
larisation thesis, scholarship on religion in politics abounded in response to events
such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran, liberation theology in Latin America, the
global rise of evangelical Christianity, or the contribution of the Catholic and Ortho-
dox churches to the collapse of Soviet communism.6 However, most research was
either purely descriptive or an analytical exercise in structured comparisons. There
was no new theorising beyond secularist categories that either reduce religion to tran-
scendental beliefs, which are private and apolitical, or equate religious convictions
with immanent values, which are subordinate to cultures and civilisations. Both con-
ceptions of faith rule out any specifically religious impact on international politics.
For its part, the field of IR has remained wedded to the Westphalian system that
privileges absolute state sovereignty over matters of faith, which formally removed
religion from interstate relations and subordinated the transnational church to the
6 Recent overviews include Anthony Gill, ‘Religion and Comparative Politics’, Annual Review of Political
Science, 4 (2001), pp. 117–38; Kenneth D. Wald, Adam Silverman and Kevin Fridy, ‘Making Sense of
Religion in Political Life’, Annual Review of Political Science, 8 (2005), pp. 121–43.
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national state. Paradoxically, the religious roots of Westphalia – the Protestant Re-
formation and the ‘wars of religion’ – gave rise to a secularist settlement that was
partly influenced by Luther’s ‘Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms and the Two Govern-
ments’ and separated the realm of the spirit from the realm of the body politic.7
Accordingly, faith was either relegated to the sphere of religious transcendence that
is apolitical or subjected to the hegemony of secular immanence – or both at once.
This account is key to the modern invention of the antagonistic binary opposition
between the religious and the secular to which this article returns below.
The secularism of positivist and post-positivist IR theory
The modern conception of religion, which views faith as either apolitical or politi-
cised, is part of a secularist logic that has dominated IR theory since the 1950s and
1960s. The turn to positivism has imposed an empirical epistemology that analyses
social reality by using natural-scientific methods. Whether Comte’s positive science,
logic positivism, or deductive-nomological models, all three variants of positivism
dismiss unobservable values and practices such as religion by reducing reality to
empirically observable facts. As Steve Smith notes, ‘[l]ying at the very heart of
value-neutrality was a very powerful normative project, one every bit as ‘‘political’’ or
‘‘biased’’ as the approaches marginalized and delegitimized in the name of science’.8
Positivist approaches have eschewed grand theory and debates about alternative
accounts of ontology and epistemology in favour of increasingly narrow discussions
on issues of methodology. In the words of Smith,
[t]he discipline has tended to accept implicitly a rather simple and, crucially, an uncontested
set of positivist assumptions which have fundamentally stifled debate over both what the world
is like and how we might explain it. This is not true for those who have worked either in the
so-called ‘English school’ or at the interface between international relations and political
theory, because these writers never bought into the positivist assumptions that dominated the
discipline.9
Post-positivism is critical of positivism but no less secularist in outlook. Different
approaches tend to replace the positivist focus on methodology with a post-positivist
emphasis on both ontology and epistemology. But like positivism, post-positivism
presupposes that social reality is autonomous and excludes any transcendent horizon,
which subsumes religious beliefs and practices under general analytical categories
that are secularist.
Mainstream IR theory is characterised by ontological, epistemological, and method-
ological commitments to secularism, above all subordinating agency to structure and
subjecting both faith and intentionality to secular reason. Even the 1980s renaissance
of normative theory occurred within the dominant secularist parameters of an
academic discipline, which had been Christian in origin but ‘was, by this time, an
7 Daniel Philpott, ‘The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations’, World Politics, 52:2 (2000),
pp. 206–45; William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of
Modern Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
8 Steve Smith, ‘The Forty Years’ Detour: The Resurgence of Normative Theory in International Rela-
tions’, Millennium, 21:3 (1992), pp. 489–508, at p. 490.
9 Steve Smith, ‘Positivism and beyond’, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds), Interna-
tional Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 11–44, at
p. 11.
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organized International Relations profession [in which] the question of religion had
been firmly relegated to the private sphere, and mainstream theorists either sub-
ordinated agency and motive to structure or else aspired to weave international society
with the thin thread of universal optimizing rationality’.10 Thus it is surely no coinci-
dence that grand theory and religion disappeared together from IR.
The discipline’s ‘secularist bias’ explains why mainstream IR theory struggles
to incorporate the role of faith in international affairs. Most IR scholars theorise
religion in one of two ways: either within the existing traditions of (neo-)realism,
(neo-)liberalism, (neo-)Marxism and social constructivism or else by positing new
paradigms such as the ‘clash of civilizations’, ‘multiple modernities’, ‘the revenge of
God’, and the rise of religious fundamentalism or the conflict that opposes faith to
secular reason.11 The former approach subsumes religion under conventional concep-
tual units in IR such as power, wealth, interest, social values, or identity. As such,
it subjects religious faith to a determinism that is variously more materialist (as in
liberalism and Marxism) or more ideational (as in realism and constructivism).12
The latter approach enthrones religion as the central analytical category that under-
pins cultural sources of conflict and other driving forces of international affairs. In
this way, new paradigms claim that religious faith systematically trumps other ideas
in the making of international relations. In the first case religion is defined in epiphe-
nomenal terms as a general motivation alongside other factors without any indepen-
dent, specific import. In the second case it is defined in essentialist terms as an inner
impulse and/or an abstract set of beliefs grounding individual and collective identity.
Neither conception captures the specificity of religion and the particular ways in
which faith shapes politics.
Inventing ‘religion’
Defining religion in either epiphenomenal or essentialist terms is itself a distinctly
modern, Western invention.13 Historically, the sixteenth and the seventeenth century
saw the construction of a new category of ‘natural religion’ that coincided with the
rise of modern science.14 Accordingly, religion as a concrete practice of faith within
a community of believers was gradually supplanted by new notions of religion as a
10 Charles A. Jones, ‘Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School’, International Relations,
17:3 (2003), pp. 371–87, at p. 372.
11 In addition to Huntington, Clash, see Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Patterns of Modernity Beyond the West
(London: Pinter, 1987); S. N. Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities’, Daedalus, 129:1 (2000), pp. 1–29;
Gilles Kepel, La Revanche de Dieu. Chre´tiens, juifs et musulmans a` la reconqueˆte du monde (Paris: Seuil,
1991), trans. The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern
World, trans. A. Braley (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Benjamin Barber,
Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Times Book, 1995); Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?
Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993);
M. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2000).
12 Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004), pp. 9–33.
13 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
14 Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Peter Harrison, ‘Religion’ and the Religions in
the English Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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set of abstract, generalisable principles, beliefs or emotions. These could take one of
two forms: either ‘inner’ psychological phenomena linked to human nature (rather than
the entire cosmos) or ‘outer’ social phenomena tied to formal institutions and general
spiritual exercises (rather than specific communities and practices of worship) – or
both at once. This modern shift of focus from objective revelation to subjective belief
equated religion with ‘a set of propositions to which believers gave assent, and which
could therefore be judged and compared between different religions and as against
natural science’.15 The dominant modern definitions privilege private faith at the
expense of a community of believers, which reduces religion to subjective values and
removes faith from its communal embeddedness.16
Closely connected with this critique is the argument that religion is a marker of
social identity because ‘religious ideas don’t simply express interest, they constitute
them’.17 Religious faith precedes the calculation and defence of individual and collective
interest or the construction of social identity that is central to mainstream IR theories.
Crucially, religion is not just a ‘moral statement to which rational autonomous indi-
viduals give their intellectual consent’; rather, it is constitutive of a ‘cognitive script . . .
[that] people internalize . . . not out of conscious choice . . . [and] in ways that can
override rational choice or utility-maximizing behavior’.18 Belief is part of a broader
reason that seeks the public common good. Indeed, faith is neither a sort of innate,
natural religion nor a blind, fideistic belief in an external divinity whose arbitrary
intervention determines reality. On the contrary, religious ideas and practices con-
stitute distinct visions of the world that are irreducible to any other sphere (nature
or consciousness), while at the same time being embedded in narrative and culture.
Just as there is no pure reason, so too there is no absolute unmediated faith.
The modern logic of binary opposites
Linked to the secularist definition of religion is a series of binary opposites that under-
pin IR: the secular versus the religious, immanent nature versus the transcendent
supernatural, reason versus faith, unbelief versus belief or the private sphere versus
the public realm. As Roland Bleiker suggests, ‘IR theory and Western conceptualis-
ing in general have traditionally been based on the juxtaposition of antagonistic
bipolar opposites.’19 Like ‘natural religion’, such and similar binaries are a distinctly
modern invention. Binary opposites are grounded in the dualistic logic of modern
thinking that is often attributed to Plato’s legacy of separating things from ideas or
to Descartes’s division of mind and body. However, modern dualism can be traced to
fourteenth- and fifteenth-century philosophical shifts and political changes, as John
15 Asad, Genealogies, p. 41.
16 On conceptual and methodological reflections about religion in IR theory beyond an instrumental and
an essentialist view of faith, see Mona Kanwal Sheikh, ‘How does religion matter? Pathways to religion
in International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 38:2 (2012), pp. 365–92.
17 Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 12.
18 Thomas, Global Resurgence, p. 95.
19 Roland Bleiker, ‘East-West Stories of War and Peace: Neorealist Claims in Light of Ancient Chinese
Philosophy’, in Stephen Chan, Peter Mandaville, and Roland Bleiker (eds), The Zen of International
Relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 177–201, at p. 181.
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Milbank, Charles Taylor and others have argued.20 In this period, the meaning
of ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ changed fundamentally. In pre-modern societies the sacred
tended to be seen as a cosmic reality that is diffusely mediated through signs and
symbols in the natural and social world. By contrast, modernity views the sacred as
an immutable essence and the object of an internal human experience which Durkheim
calls ‘religious’.21 Likewise, pre-modern accounts of the secular accentuated the
temporal dimension (for example, the interval between fall and eschaton), whereas
modernity defines the secular spatially as an autonomous domain separate from
God and the Church.
The dualism that underpins the secularist logic of IR theory is ultimately based
on the modern separation of secular immanence from sacred transcendence: in his
seminal work A Secular Age, Taylor writes that ‘[o]ne of the great inventions of the
West was that of an immanent order in Nature, whose working could be systemati-
cally understood and explained on its own terms.’22 As such, the notion of a self-
sufficient secular order of nature either relegates religion to the supernatural realm
known by blind faith alone or else equates religion with a purely natural epipheno-
menon of human consciousness or social construct (or both at once).
Moreover, the modern primacy of pure nature reconfigures the sacred as the
opposite of the secular.23 Just as ‘the sacred’ is now confined to the supernatural
sphere of absolute transcendence that is divorced from the natural sphere of pure
immanence, so too ‘the secular’ now institutes ‘the religious’ as its opposite. This
reduces religion to a private creed rather than the communal practice of a shared
faith within living social traditions that involve metaphysical questions about the
nature of the world and the finalities of life in the polity. The secular space of politics
is henceforth sundered from faith and governed by reason alone. So configured, both
religious faith and universal human virtues or passions (such as sympathy, reciprocity,
mutuality, or justice) are subsumed under the purported universalism of formal, proce-
dural and instrumental rationality.
De-sacralising and re-sacralising the public sphere
Secularism is not limited to the functional differentiation of religious and political
authority and/or the public settlement of the relationship between church and state
that writes faith out of international relations.24 By subordinating faith to secular
20 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory. Beyond secular reason (2nd edn, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006
[orig. pub. 1990]); Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Louis
Dupre´, Passage to Modernity. An essay on the hermeneutics of nature and culture (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1993); Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2008).
21 E´mile Durkheim, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. J. S. Swain (London: Allen and Unwin,
1915), p. 37.
22 Taylor, Secular Age, p. 15.
23 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Palo Alto: Stanford University
Press, 2003).
24 See Taylor, Secular Age, p. 2; Hurd, Politics, pp. 5–13; Shah and Philpott, ‘The Fall and Rise of Reli-
gion’, esp. pp. 25–37; Wilson, After Secularism, pp. 13–24; Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott,
and Timothy Samuel Shah, God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics (New York: W. W.
Norton & Co., 2011), pp. 20–47.
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categories, the secularist logic does not merely de-sacralise the public square. It rein-
vests it with quasi-sacred meaning by sacralising secularity – the king, the nation, the
state, the market, the individual, or the collective. As such, secularism does not so
much mark the demise of faith or the exit from religion as it represents an alternative
sacrality – a secular capture of the sacred.
This twin transformation was neither universal nor exemplary nor normative but
instead particular, contingent and in some sense arbitrary, linked to both ideational
shifts and material changes. Accordingly the secular does not constitute a naturally
given base that determines the sacred superstructure. There is no historical deter-
minism according to which secularism will always remain hegemonic in Europe.
Nor does it follow that other parts of the world will necessarily follow Europe’s
‘exceptional example’.25 On the contrary, the secularist logic in IR theory and other
disciplines is linked to a certain kind of historicism that views the peculiar history
of religion and politics in Western Europe as an exemplification of a fated and all-
determining evolution. This reflects the positivist pathway from revelation via meta-
physics to science, as Comte advocated.26 Post-positivist approaches in IR challenge
the idea that politics and IR are reducible to a positive science but they do not break
out of secularist categories, as I have already indicated.
Crucially, the secularism of mainstream IR theory institutes a new account of the
sacred. Modernity created a new economy of power and knowledge enforced by the
institutions of the modern state and the modern market. By progressively subjecting
everything to standards of abstract value, the system of national states and transna-
tional markets did not simply subordinate the sanctity of life and land to a model of
central, sovereign power. It also supplanted such older notions of the sacred with a
new, secularist simulacrum of sacrality – the ‘glorious reign’ of capitalist market
commodities and the disembodied state.27 Insofar as they replace real relations
among existing things with standards of nominal value to which they nonetheless
ascribe quasi-sacred status, both modern commerce and politics can be described as
‘quasi-religions’.28
For these reasons, the modern system of sovereignty requires for its very opera-
tion (and not just as mere ideological obfuscation) a redefinition of sanctity. The
dominant strand of modern theory and practice is ultimately secularist because it
invests both the instrumental, economic sphere and the immanent social/political
space with quasi-sacred significance. Thus the issue is not so much whether secularism
privatises faith. Rather, from the perspective of religious traditions the problem with
secularism is that it profanes the sacred and sacralises the profane.
25 See Adrian Pabst, ‘The Western Paradox: Why the United States is more Religious but less Christian
than Europe’, in Lucian Leustean (ed.), Representing Religion in the European Union: Does God Matter?
(London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 168–84.
26 Andrew Wernick, Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity: The Post-Theistic Program of French
Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); in contrast, see Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams
and Modernities (London: Verso, 1993); John Gray, Al Qaeda and What It Means to Be Modern (London:
Faber and Faber, 2003).
27 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 42–86, 193–313; Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory:
For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 2011).
28 Walter Benjamin, ‘Capitalism as Religion’, in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings – Volume 1 (1913–
1926), eds Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996),
pp. 288–91.
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III. Post-secularity, secular reason, and the limits of pluralism
In response to the global religious resurgence, a number of scholars have challenged
the secularist logic of IR and related fields.29 Compared with the ‘de-secularisation
thesis’, post-secularity, and cognate notions such as ‘multiple modernities’ go further
by challenging the hegemony of secularism and defending the freedom of religions to
express themselves directly in their own terms within the public square (nationally
and globally).30 Common to different accounts of post-secularity is methodological
and political pluralism and also the idea of a post-secularist society in which religions
are an integral part of a reinvigorated political sphere: ‘The contemporary context
may be described as a postsecularist space [. . .] a period in which, for the first time,
multiple modernities, each with their respective relationship to religious belief and
practice, are overlapping and interacting within the same shared, predominantly urban
spaces’.31 However, this section argues that post-secularity is trapped in a residually
secularist logic.
Unbelief and secular reason
First of all, the post-secular fails to challenge the secularist account of religion that
essentialises faith or views it as an epiphenomenon (or both, as I have argued). The
work of Ju¨rgen Habermas encapsulates the oscillation between a more philosophical
(essentialist) conception of faith as a source of moral intuition or meaning, on the
one hand, and a more sociological (epiphenomenal) idea of religion as an archaic
mode of political unity or social control, on the other hand. In his recent work, he
fuses these two definitions by arguing that faith is socially useful because ‘particularly
in regards to vulnerable social relations . . . [religion] possesses the power to convinc-
ingly articulate moral sensitivities and solidaristic intuitions’.32 Habermas and other
theorists of the post-secular, who have influenced IR theory, cling to conceptions of
religion that fail to contest the modern transformation in the nature of belief itself
(especially in the Judeo-Christian tradition).33 This applies to the shift away from
the cultural mediations of objective revelation and the communal practice of faith
towards subjective assent and a private, sacramentally unmediated relationship be-
tween the individual and the divine.
29 Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile
(London: Palgrave, 2003); Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion; Thomas, Global Resurgence; Toft,
Philpott, and Shah, God’s Century; Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Jonathan VanAntwerpen
(eds), Rethinking Secularism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan
Vanantwerpen (eds), The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (New York: Columbia University Press,
2011).
30 Philip S. Gorski, John Torpey, and David Kyuman Kim (eds), The Post-Secular in Question. Religion in
Contemporary Society (New York: New York University Press, 2012).
31 Luke Bretherton, Christianity and Contemporary Politics. The Conditions and Possibilities of Faithful
Witness (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 15, emphasis in original.
32 Ju¨rgen Habermas, ‘Secularism’s Crisis of Faith: Notes on a Post-Secular Society’, New Perspectives
Quarterly, 25:4 (2008), pp. 17–29, at p. 29, originally published in German in Bla¨tter fu¨r deutsche und
internationale Politik (April 2008), pp. 33–46.
33 Craig Calhoun, Eduardo Mendieta, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (eds), Habermas and Religion
(Cambridge: Polity, 2012).
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Therefore post-secularity accepts uncritically ‘the change . . . which takes us from
a society in which was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which
faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others’, as
Taylor puts it.34 Implicit in this secularist account is the assumption that enlightened
citizens choose unbelief over belief: ‘[t]he presumption of unbelief has become domi-
nant in more and more . . . milieux; and has achieved hegemony in certain crucial
ones, in the academic and intellectual life, for instance, whence it can more easily
extend itself to others’.35 Unbelief constitutes the default position and the supposedly
neutral vantage point from which religion is defined and the impact of faith on inter-
national affairs can be analysed. The post-secular implies that the moral intuitions
of religious traditions should be included in political debate and be allowed to con-
tribute to the common good, but merely on secular terms and in instrumental ways
that serve the purposes of secular politics.36
Second, post-secularity fails to overcome the hegemony of secular reason. Despite
inflecting his long-standing Enlightenment stance, Habermas still claims that faith is
arational or even irrational and that the gulf separating post-metaphysical, secular
rationality from religious revelation cannot be bridged.37 Furthermore, he assumes
that only reason sundered from faith can preserve state neutrality vis-a`-vis rival and
conflicting religions: ‘the domain of the state, which controls the means of legitimate
coercion, should not be opened to the strife between various religious communities,
otherwise the government could become the executive arm of a religious majority
that imposes its will on the opposition’.38 Thus Habermas’s vindication of the secular
state is more concerned with the clash of fanatical faiths than it is with the violent
wars of secular utopias. It is true that his argument in favour of translating the moral
sentiments of religious believers into the discourse of secular reason encourages
a measure of mutual learning between religious and non-religious traditions.39
However, for Habermas the common language in both public debate and political
deliberation must be free of any religious references to transcendent principles and
governed by secular reason alone. As a result, post-secularity does not transform
the secularist terms of debate and engagement between religions and other perspec-
tives. For faith is not permitted to make any substantive or critical contribution to
public discussion that could undermine the primacy of formal, procedural reason.40
Paradoxically, the post-secular uses religion to compensate for an instrumental ratio-
nality whose shortcomings are the result of divorcing faith from reason in the first
place.
34 Taylor, Secular Age, p. 3.
35 Taylor, Secular Age, p. 13.
36 In contrast, see Antonio Cerella, ‘Religion and Political Form: Carl Schmitt’s Genealogy of Politics as
Critique of the Secular/Post-Secular Dichotomy’, this Special Issue.
37 Ju¨rgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Between Metaphysics and the Critique of Reason, trans.
William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Ju¨rgen Habermas, ‘An Awareness of What is
Missing’, in J. Habermas et al., An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular
Age, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), pp. 15–23.
38 Habermas, ‘Secularism’s Crisis’, p. 28.
39 For a critical account of Habermas, see Dallmayr, ‘Post-Secularity’, and Joseph A. Camilleri, ‘Post-
secularist Discourse in an ‘‘Age of Transition’’ ’, this Special Issue.
40 Ju¨rgen Habermas, ‘Prepolitical foundations of the democratic constitutional state?’, in J. Habermas and
J. Ratzinger (eds), The Dialectics of Secularization (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), pp. 19–52.
1004 Adrian Pabst
Habermas’s post-metaphysical politics
In section four, this article returns to the possibility of synthesising reason with faith,
understood primarily as a form of pre-rational trust in the reasonableness of reality.
For now, a third point needs to be made about the concept of post-secularity. In his
recent work, Habermas has somewhat broadened his model of translating religious
intuitions into the secular language of political discourse, which permits faith tradi-
tions to contribute to the common life within the shared public square. Contrary to
his earlier, Enlightenment rejection of faith as irrational superstition and dangerous
belief, he now acknowledges ‘the shared origin of philosophy and religion in the
revolution in worldviews of the Axial Age’.41 Likewise, he welcomes the religious
contribution to a new, post-secular normativity that provides resistance to the purely
instrumentalist reason of both utilitarian ethics and liberal capitalism. However,
Habermas’s proposed procedure of translation remains residually secularist. He con-
vincingly contests the liberal public-private divide and the exclusion of faith from
politics, but rather like Rawls he defends the hegemony of the secularist settlement
and the post-metaphysical outlook of the Enlightenment legacy. The transcendent
is now permitted within the public square but merely as a source of morality and
strictly limited to informal communication among citizens.
In contrast, formal deliberations at the level of the state and its agencies must be
protected from religion by an institutional filter, which suspends all metaphysical
questions and reduces religious belief to a purely private decision. In this manner,
Habermas draws an absolute line between the public square and the state, on the
one hand, and communities and groups, on the other hand – a divide that religious
arguments are not allowed to transgress.42 The overriding reason for rejecting
metaphysics is to secure immanent, secular values without appealing to transcendent
religious principles. This ignores not just implicit metaphysical assumptions that are
inherent in supposedly post-metaphysical thinking like, for instance, the nature of
justice, the source of rights and responsibilities or the finality of politics. It also leaves
unresolved the conflicts between rival, incommensurable non-religious values like
freedom, equality, or security that cannot be reconciled by secular rationality.
Fourth, the secularist bias against metaphysics also reinforces the dominance of
immanentist reasoning that characterises both positivism and post-positivism in IR
theory. With few exceptions, they are united in ruling out a teleological ordering
of politics towards a substantive, plural unity such as the common good or the duty
to uphold the dignity of the human person, which goes beyond notions of utility,
happiness, or individual human rights.43 In turn, the denial of shared ends serves to
disallow the particularity of universal religious principles in the name of a secularist
universalism for which everything is an expression of immanence that cuts out the
possibility of a transcendent outlook.
41 Habermas, ‘Awareness’, p. 17; see also Habermas, ‘Secularism’s Crisis’.
42 Ju¨rgen Habermas, ‘Religion in the public square’, European Journal of Philosophy, 14:1 (2006), pp. 1–
25; J. Habermas, ‘On the Relations Between the Secular Liberal State and Religion’, in Hent de Vries
and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds), Political Theologies. Public Religion in a Post-Secular World (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2006), pp. 251–60.
43 One exception in IR is the debate generated by Alexander Wendt, ‘Why a World State is Inevitable’,
European Journal of International Relations, 9:4 (2003), pp. 491–542.
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As such, both positivism and post-positivism rest on a grounding in the pure
immanence of nature or culture (or both at once), which on closer inspection turns
out to be a transcendental foundation. For example, positivist theories of IR, which
rely on empirical epistemology as the sole path to progress, elevate the empirical into
the sole transcendental term and seek to enthrone humanity as the measure of all
things.44 Similarly, post-positivist theories of IR, which reject all meta-narratives,
view the particular as the only permissible form of universality and deny meaning
and perennial principles in the name of perpetual flux.45 Most world religions, by
contrast, reject any absolute separation of immanence from transcendence. Various
faith traditions suggest that the immanent order of politics and international rela-
tions benefits from transcendent reference points (not a transcendental grounding, as
in Kant) that can uphold normativity beyond power, wealth, instrumental interests
or constructed values.
Sacralising difference or converting the ‘other’ into the ‘same’
The fifth argument against the post-secular relates to notions of difference and alterity.
The appeal to the diversity of difference, which underpins the post-secular pluralism
advocated by figures such as Habermas or Connolly, is but an intensification of
modern positivism and transcendentalism.46 For postmodern philosophy elevates
difference into the sole transcendental term, which overrides any notion of normative
unity or substantive shared ends that embed the legislating reason of citizens and
states. Difference so defined either sanctifies the power of Kant’s transcendentally
regulative reason or else it sacralises the ‘other’. Neither conception works on its own
terms, and both are ultimately secularist. The use of reason requires and involves some
form of trust in the reasonableness and regularity of reality, which is neither reducible
to the forces of unalterable nature nor the power of human artifice (the social contract
or the will-to-power) nor pre-rational moral sentiments (empathy or the ‘invisible
hand’ of the market).
Rather, to trust that reality is to some extent reasonable and regular implies that
the natural and the social world are endowed with some intelligible meaning and that
they are governed by some knowable finality. Rationality appeals to something beyond
the individual mind that links us to symbols, signs, and narratives, which we all inhabit
and which embed the exercise of reason itself. Seen from this perspective, the post-
secular turn of theory that has influenced IR theory is in reality ‘intra-secular’,
as Gregor McLennan has argued.47 However, the purported neutrality of political
reason that now admits religion into the public square must also be questioned. As
Milbank contends against McLennan,
44 Smith, ‘Positivism’, and Martin Hollis, ‘Probing puzzles persistently: a desirable but improbable future
for IR theory’, in Smith et al. (eds), International Theory, pp. 11–44 and 301–8.
45 Zaki Laı¨di, Un monde prive´ de sens (rev. edn, Paris: Fayard, 1996), trans. A World Without Meaning:
The Crisis of Meaning in International Politics, trans. J. Burnham and J. Coulon (London: Routledge,
1998).
46 William Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
47 Gregor McLennan, ‘The Postsecular Turn’, Theory, Culture & Society, 27:4 (2010), pp. 3–20.
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even this sense of the neutrality and immanence of pure reason is the upshot of a specific
Western legacy and has to remain debatable from a genealogical and meta-critical perspective,
like that of Talal Asad. Can rational neutrality really engender sufficiently thick shared values
to sustain social and political unity? Is reason really just a matter of subjective hope and not of
religious faith, as McLennan claims? Surely, to the contrary, to think that reason will disclose
reality is precisely (as Kant declared) to have faith in a link between reason and the real?48
According to Kant’s Opus postumum, reason gives us access to reality insofar as we
always already trust that reality is reasonable and that rationality is linked to a real,
objective order – not just to our nominal, mental categories. Thus, reason properly
configured seems to point to a transcendence that is somehow present in immanence.
To restrict rationality to regulative reason is to impose a secularist limit of finitude on
the human desire for transcendent infinity that finds its expressions in both religious
and non-religious traditions. Such a limit means that ‘[e]verything is to be negatively
tolerated, but nothing is to be positively allowed’,49 an account that favours the
empty formalism and proceduralism of secular reason over religious faith embodied
in communal practice.
Moreover, the shift in emphasis away from the modern dialectics of positivism
and transcendentalism towards post-modern difference (however spelled) merely re-
inforces the sacralisation of the secular, which is the mark of secularism. By enshrin-
ing difference as the new ‘absolute’, post-modernism elevates alterity or otherness
into the sole transcendental term that rules out any substantive, plural unity which
might bind together the national polity or the international system. Thus post-secular
pluralism involves one of two positions. Either difference is absolutised, in which
case incommensurable values and violent conflict become self-fulfilling prophesies
that can only be settled through the use of power. Or else the only mode of attaining
unity or at least some form of peaceful coexistence is to convert the ‘other’ into the
‘same’ through ahistorical, supposedly universal but in reality modern, Western
categories. The most prominent examples are perhaps the values of ‘liberation’ or
‘emancipation’ linked to the political left or the values of ‘freedom of choice’ and
‘opportunity’ associated with the political right. Both variants of liberal progres-
sivism are part of the Whig interpretation of history that Herbert Butterfield rebutted
in his eponymous book.50 In this sense the post-modern diversity of difference, which
is celebrated by post-secular pluralism, is akin to the modern promise of boundless,
linear progress that secularism purported to provide but failed to deliver.
Post-secular determinism
Sixth, post-secularity is wedded to a historical and materialist determinism that char-
acterises modern secularism. The rise to power of secularism in the West was the
product of particular, contingent and in some sense arbitrary processes that were
neither exemplary nor necessary nor normative, as the previous section indicated.
Precisely because historicism treats history as a fated and all-determining teleological
process, the genuine alternative is not to opt for ahistorical, secular categories that
are supposedly universal. Instead, it is to embrace history in such a way as to view
48 John Milbank, ‘The Postsecular and Postcolonial’, Theory, Culture & Society, 29 (2012), in press.
49 Milbank, ‘The Postsecular’.
50 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London: George Bell, 1949).
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social and political developments in terms of their specific historical roots and their
unfolding over time and across space. Apparently universal ideas and structures such
as the global system of national states and transnational markets, which underpins
modern international relations, can thus be traced genealogically to particular periods
such as the Protestant Reformation or the religious wars in the ‘long sixteenth century’
(ca. 1450–1650). Far from being isolated events or absolute breaks in history, they
were part of an era spanning the early fourteenth to the late seventeenth century during
which both ideas and practices already nascent during the Middle Ages achieved fuller
maturity and developed into the modern model of international affairs.51
That is why, in the well-known words of Martin Wight, ‘[a]t Westphalia the
states system does not come into existence, it comes of age.’52 Certain new ideas
such as national sovereignty came to shape the way that international relations were
conceived and instituted.53 Likewise, new institutions and practices like the national
state or inter-state warfare led to changes in conceptions of international affairs that
still shape IR theory.54 Thus, theory and practice influence one another, and intellec-
tual history and the history of actual international relations interact as part of ‘living
traditions’ that encompass both action and enquiry, as the work of Wight suggests.55
Contrary to the historical determinism of (post-)secular thinking, the notion of
tradition serves the heuristic function of mediating between theory and practice and
outflanking both dualism and monism. Indeed, the English School’s appeal to three
traditions of international theory breaks with the causal, determinative interpretation
of history by rejecting the diametrically opposed extremes of Hobbesian/Machiavellian
realism and Kantian/Marxian revolutionism and by embracing Grotian rationalism
as a via media – even if this reading of Grotius and classical thinking more generally
has been too narrowly focused on the human artifice of modern states and abstract
rules.56 Linked to the actuality of a third tradition is the argument that English
School international theory seeks to overcomes the double divide between the histori-
cism of secular ideology and the ‘presentism’ of empirical or rationalist science and
also between the empirical and the normative by developing an integrated, histori-
cised account of ‘how states do behave and how they ought to behave’.57 Based on
51 Brian Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 1150–1650 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1982); J. H. Burns, ‘Introduction’, in J. H. Burns (ed.), Cambridge History of
Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 1–8; Francis Oakley,
Natural Law, Laws of Nature, Natural Rights: Continuity and Discontinuity in the History of Ideas
(New York: Continuum, 2005).
52 Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 152; see also Ludwig
Dehio, The Precarious Balance. Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle, trans. C. Fulman
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), esp. p. 23.
53 See, inter alia, Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995); Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty. How ideas shaped modern international relations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
54 See, inter alia, Michael Howard, ‘War and the nation state’, Daedalus, 108 (1979), pp. 101–10; Thomas
Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe
(Cambridge: Polity, 1997).
55 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, eds B. Porter and G. Wight (Leicester:
Leicester University Press, 1991), esp. p. 260.
56 On other conceptual limitations of the English School and new avenues, see Barry Buzan, ‘The English
School: an underexploited resource in IR’, Review of International Studies, 27:3 (2001), pp. 471–88;
and the response by Andrew Hurrell, ‘Keeping history, law and political philosophy firmly within the
English School’, Review of International Studies, 27:3 (2001), pp. 489–94.
57 Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society. A History of the English School (Houndmills: Macmillan,
1998), pp. 54–5.
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first-order political questions and a method that historicises perennial principles such
as justice, the English School attempts to offer an alternative not only to the dualism of
realism and idealism that has characterised the field since E. H. Carr but also to the
monism of mainstream IR theory that subordinates international relations to secular
standards (which are variously more positivist or more post-positivist).
In contrast, post-secularity locks IR theory into the logic of secularism by treating
the modern secularist settlement either as an ahistorical norm or as an example of
historical evolution. Accordingly, the post-secular perpetuates the idea that religion
is ultimately subordinate to the political authority of national states and represents
merely one among many, equally valid voices within the nascent cosmopolitan public
square. Thus, post-secularity’s claim to pluralism barely disguises the hegemony of
secular reason and liberal market democracy.58 Connected to this is the tendency to
reject the traditional universalism of both church and empire while simultaneously
defending the modern universalism of sovereign states, free markets, individual human
rights, and global civil society that accepts modernity’s secularist outlook.59 Here one
can suggest a parallel argument: just as post-positivist approaches have remained
trapped within positivist parameters, so too post-secular theory is residually secularist.
The dominant schools foreclose the possibility of grand theory in IR because they
bracket religion and metaphysics out of the picture, notably debates about the nature
of ‘reality’, our knowledge of it and the kinds of things that ‘make the world hang
together’.60
IV. Beyond secularism: metaphysics, religion, and the revival of grand theory in IR
The emerging ‘turn to religion’ in IR theory is in large part based on the post-meta-
physical thinking of contemporary political theorists like Habermas or Connolly. But
if, as this article has argued, the notion of post-secularity remains trapped in a secu-
larist logic, perhaps it is the case that the overcoming of secularism in IR requires the
recovery of metaphysics and not its abandonment. Moreover, if the ‘end of meta-
physics’ evokes Nietzsche’s proclamation that ‘God is dead’, perhaps it is then also
the case that the ‘return of God’ to international affairs portends the revival of meta-
physical thinking. Since the decline of grand theory in IR can be traced to the rise of
post-metaphysics, the end of ‘the end of metaphysics’ offers a prospect of alternatives
to the fixation with methodology and other narrow debates that have dominated the
discipline since its secular turn in the 1950s and 1960s.
In the remaining available space, this article charts a conceptual map and suggests
a number of avenues. The objective is to shape the terms of debate on theorising
religion in international relations and on reviving grand theory in IR, not to state a
fixed position. The focus is on three associated areas: first, the link between meta-
physical ideas and international theory; second, the relationship between reason and
belief in a way that avoids the clash of unmediated secular rationality with blind
58 Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society. A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Rela-
tions (London: Verso, 1994); Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648. Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of
Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003).
59 Pierre Manent, Les me´tamorphoses de la cite´: Essai sur la dynamique de l’Occident (Paris: Flammarion,
2010).
60 John G. Ruggie, ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Construc-
tivist Challenge’, International Organization, 52:4 (1998), pp. 855–85.
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faith; third, the notion of an ‘corporate’ association of peoples and nations, which is
not only more primary than the modern subsumption of individuals, groups, and the
intermediary institutions of civil society under the shared supremacy of national
states and transnational markets, but also more fundamental than either the concepts
of ‘international society’, ‘world society’, or ‘world community’.61
‘Grand theory’, metaphysics, and the foundations of the English School
What stands in the way of renewed grand theory in IR is secularism, notably three
specific problems: first, the limits on reason; second, the dominance of secular stan-
dards that are variously more empirical or more normative (or both at once); third, a
series of ontological, epistemological and methodological commitments that preclude
debates about first-order political questions and the possible links between immanent
values and transcendent principles. Up to a point, the exception to this has been the
English School and those scholars who work at the interface of IR and political/
social theory. However, neither approach has so far properly theorised religion in
international affairs, and the reason is to do with metaphysical ideas. Starting with
social/political theory, one can suggest that the contemporary post-metaphysical
project ultimately rests on the very secularism that it purports to overcome, as the
previous section has already indicated. For example, Habermas’s and Connolly’s
notion of post-secularity rejects the ideological hegemony of secular liberalism and
the dystopia of global capitalism, which are complicit with one another and represent
the highest contemporary expressions of secularism. But by the same token, the post-
liberal politics of pluralism remains locked in the secularist logic of de-sacralising
and re-sacralising the political sphere by investing either the national-republican state
or the global-cosmopolitan public square with quasi-sacred significance. In this sense,
post-secularity marks an intensification of secularism rather than a new mode of
theorising religion in international affairs.
Just as general IR theory took a secular turn in the 1950s and 1960s, so too the
specifically Christian terminology of early English School writings was gradually re-
placed by a discourse that focused on the institutions of international society, ‘leaving
many Christians trading in secular currency, where formerly agnostics had quite
comfortably used religious coinage’.62 With the growing influence of Hedley Bull’s
work, the dominant strand of the English School privileged the formal-procedural
dimension of international society over questions of substance such as natural law,
community, association, or the common good that constitute the unity of the social
world and humankind. Bull and his English School contemporaries offered an alter-
native to the scientistic dystopia of realism and the idealistic utopia of revolutionism.
But the price they paid for making Grotius’s rationalist tradition part of the main-
stream IR debate was to eschew a metaphysical worldview connected with Christianity
in favour of a secular discourse centred on increasingly abstract, vacuous categories
61 In his article ‘One order, two laws: recovering the ‘‘normative’’ in English School theory’, Review of
International Studies, 33:4 (2007), pp. 557–75, William Bain shows that the English School lacks an
account of obligation beyond procedural norms. My article draws on Bain’s argument to suggest that
the common good and other substantive ends are similarly missing from the work of Butterfield, Wight,
and other English School members.
62 Jones, ‘Christian Realism’, p. 372.
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such as ‘common interests, common values . . . a common set of rules . . . [and] com-
mon institutions’.63 As with IR thinking in general, the English School’s secular,
post-metaphysical turn coincided with the decline of grand theory.
It is surely right to view the legacy of Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight as a
better starting point to develop a metaphysical IR tradition that can conceptualise
religion in international affairs and revive grand theory. Common to their work is a
critique of secularism and an attempt to reintegrate religion into politics. Both men
viewed the Cold War as the final destruction of Christendom. In 1951, Butterfield
warned of a ‘serious collapse of civilisation’ across Europe and suggested that the
violent clash of secular totalitarianism marked a point in history at which ‘the Dark
Ages have actually returned’.64 Three years earlier, Martin Wight had made the
point that the modern secularist settlement culminates in post-1945 bipolarity, which
licenses absolute power without ethical limits:
It is in the international sphere that the demonic concentrations of power of the modern neo-
pagan world have their clearest expression. Russia and America are the last two Great Powers
within the Westernized system of sovereign states. And the characteristic of that system, after
centuries in which the Church has had no influence upon its development, is the emancipation
of power from moral restraints. Leviathan is a simple beast; his law is self-preservation, his
appetite is for power. The process of international politics that has followed from this is
equally simple: the effective Powers in the world have decreased in number and increased in
size, and the method has been war.65
Likewise, Butterfield and Wight believed that the modern separation of the sacred
from the secular does not reflect the nature the world we all inhabit. On the contrary,
heavenly and earthly powers are inextricably intertwined and interact with one another
according to certain patterns – in line with the idea that immanent reality bears the
trace of its transcendent source and in part reflects the divine warrant. As such, for
Christians like Butterfield and Wight the world is not just fallen and sinful but also
preserves the original promise of peace and harmonious ordering just because that is
what the personal Creator God intends for His creation and has revealed to Israel
and in Christ.
Crucially, the two men defend variants of Christian realism that are not dualist
but instead emphasise the plural unity of the world. Against the Hobbesian fear of a
violent state of nature and the war of all against all (which underpins much of main-
stream IR theory), Butterfield and Wight shifted the focus back on the social nature
of mankind and the idea that human cooperation precedes the contractual arrange-
ments both within and across nations. Just as national societies are bound together
by much more than contracts, so too the international society of states is governed
by a set of customs and traditions that are more fundamental than either formal rights
or commercial exchange. Precisely in the absence of a single sovereign who wields
coercive power, the glue that most of all holds together societies both nationally
and internationally is ‘an antecedent common culture’, which is more primary than
63 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (2nd edn, London: Macmillan,
1996), p. 13. This procedural vision is developed in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Expan-
sion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
64 Herbert Butterfield, ‘Christianity and Human Relationships’, in H. Butterfield, History and Human
Relations (London: Collins, 1951), p. 39.
65 Martin Wight, ‘The Church, Russia and the West’, The Ecumenical Review, 1:1 (1948), pp. 25–45, at
p. 30.
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the rights of individual citizens or sovereign states.66 Culture so configured rests on a
shared ‘cosmic, moral constitution’ that is metaphysical in nature because it links im-
manent values to their transcendent origin and outlook.67
Instead of scholastic casuistry, Butterfield and Wight appeal to the principle and
practice of love or charity, which complements both power politics and natural law
by relating the dignity of all persons to their shared transcendent origin and finality.
This metaphysical vision of perfectible unity differs markedly from the dualism be-
tween the violent ethic of coercion and the peaceful ethic of love that characterises
the thinking of the Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. In his most influential
writings, he limits charity to personal piety and justifies warfare as the fulfilment of
divine volition.68 As ‘tutors of mankind in its pilgrimage to perfection’,69 Christians
(according to Niebuhr) have a duty to join America’s divinely sanctioned mission of
spreading democracy and freedom across the globe. As such, Niebuhr’s defence of
American exceptionalism is neither Christian nor realist. In contrast, Butterfield and
Wight posit the primacy of peace over violence and emphasise the ethical constraints
on state action within and across national borders. The legacy of Butterfield and
Wight can be developed in the direction of a metaphysical-political realism that
centres on the synthesis of reason and faith, the relational nature of the world’s onto-
logical structure and various forms of association around notions of the common
good, as the remainder of this article briefly outlines.
Towards a synthesis of faith and reason
English School rationalism seeks to outflank the diametrically opposed extremes of
realism and revolutionism in favour of an account that stresses the centrality of
reason – the rationality of humankind and the divine logos as the ultimate transcen-
dent source of the world. But for all its foundations in Christian realism, the work
of Wight and Butterfield tends to view faith as private and morality as a matter of
individual conscience. Thus, only reason is universal and can mediate between rival
worldviews. This conception does not so much neglect the role of religion in politics
as it under-explores the relationship of faith to rationality. On this question, IR
theory in general and the English School in particular can learn from debates in
political theory on the global religious resurgence and its implications for public
reason. In his debate with Habermas in 2004 and his controversial Regensburg
address in 2006,70 Josef Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI) changed the terms of
debate on the question of rationality and belief in politics and international affairs.
He argued that the modern separation of natural immanence and supernatural tran-
scendence sundered faith from reason and accordingly impoverished both. The former
66 Herbert Butterfield, ‘The Historic States System’, unpublished paper, quoted in Adam Watson, ‘Fore-
word’, in James Der Derian (ed.), International Theory: Critical Investigations (Houndsmill: Macmillan,
1995), p. x.
67 Wight, International Theory, pp. 13–14.
68 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (New York: Charles Scribner, 1955); R. Niebuhr,
The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its
Traditional Defenders (London: Nisbet & Co., 1945).
69 Niebuhr, Irony, p. 71.
70 Pope Benedict XVI, The Regensburg Lecture, trans. James V. Schall S. J. (Chicago: St. Augustine’s
Press, 2007).
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was either ‘positivised’ as an inner impulse or ‘transcendentalised’ as a blind, irrational
creed. Likewise, the latter was either enthroned as the sole transcendental absolute or
reduced to the positivist rationality of calculus and scientific experimentation. Instead
of securing their respective specificity and integrity, this secularist conception pitted
faith and reason against each other. The ensuing opposition between fideism and
rationalism fuelled the clash of religious fundamentalism and secular extremism that
has characterised international relations for much of the twentieth and the early
twenty-first century.71
A non-secularist account, by contrast, offers a synthesis through which reason
and faith are mutually corrective and augmenting. Without each other’s import,
both can be distorted and instrumentalised at the service of egoism or state power:
‘distortions of religion arise when insufficient attention is given to the purifying and
structuring role of reason within religion’.72 Likewise, ‘without the corrective supplied
by religion, though, reason too can fall prey to distortions, as when it is manipulated
by ideology, or applied in a partial way that fails to take full account of the dignity
of the human person’.73 Just as rationality acts as a controlling organ that binds
belief to knowledge, so too faith can save reason from being manipulated by ideology
or applied in a partial way that ignores the complexity of the real world. Without each
other’s corrective role, distortions and pathologies arise in both religion and ‘secular
politics’. For example, fanatical believers use faith as a vehicle of hatred and seek to
refashion the whole world in their own puritanical image. Similarly, the totalitarian
ideologies of the twentieth century were variously more pagan or more atheist, and
they legitimated genocide and total warfare in the name of an exceptionalism that
was expressed in the language of secularist messianism. The impact of globalisation
risks exacerbating existing extremes and marginalising a mediating middle that
blends reason with faith.
This synthesis binds together rationality and belief in mutually beneficial ways.
Faith can reinforce trust in the human capacity for both reasoning and understand-
ing and also trust in the reasonableness of reality. Likewise, ‘secular’ rationality can
help religious belief make sense of its claims and give coherence to its intuitions.
Crucially, reason and faith can assist each other’s search for objective principles and
norms that govern personal and political action. What binds rationality to belief is
the shared commitment to universal standards of truth beyond mere logical coher-
ence and empirical validity. As such, the relatedness of reason and faith is not merely
a concern for religion but in fact lies at the heart of politics, the economy and society
both domestically and globally.
The difference with Habermas and other theorists of pluralism is that they asso-
ciate religion primarily with moral intuitions and potential for meaning. A more
metaphysical approach emphasises the proper cognitive import of faith, especially
the idea that faith precedes and exceeds reason – a pre-rational trust in the reasona-
bleness of the world that can direct rationality beyond a purely formal, instrumental
focus and open it to the possibility of shared ends, which can unite members of
different polities. Crucially, faith does not necessarily impose a set of dogmatic truths
71 See, supra, note 12.
72 Pope Benedict xvi, Meeting with the Representatives of British Society, Westminster Hall (17 September
2010), available at: {http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2010/september/
documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20100917_societa-civile_en.html}.
73 Benedict XVI, Meeting.
The secularism of post-secularity 1013
on reason, which would warrant accusations of religious fundamentalism. On the
contrary, both faith and reason share a commitment to the quest for truth – faithfully
and reasonably. Faced with threats to the universal respect of fundamental freedoms
and the dignity of the human person, politics, and international relations cannot dis-
pense with notions of truth and goodness, especially in situations where the conflict of
rival values provokes absolutist or relativist responses. To uphold genuine pluralism
requires standards of truth and goodness that can order conflicting values such as
freedom, equality or security, an argument to which I return below. For now, one
can conclude that the metaphysical principles and moral intuitions of faith offer
conceptual and practical resources to foster mutual understanding and peaceful co-
existence among different countries and cultures.
A ‘corporate’ association of nations and peoples
Faced with the global religious resurgence, theorists of post-secularity argue for plu-
ralism either by defending procedural and majoritarian terms of debate (Habermas)
that pit secular reason against faith or by embracing an immanent philosophy of dif-
ference (Connolly) that is residually transcendental. By contrast with the secularism
of both positions, this article argues in favour of a plural search for the shared com-
mon good and substantive ends that can mediate between the individual and the
collective will and thus help bind together members of diverse bodies and polities.
Such an argument challenges the view that the incommensurability of rival values
either requires central sovereign power to arbitrate conflict or else leads to a fragile
modus vivendi in which peaceful coexistence merely regulates a violent state of nature
that rules out the ontological possibility of a just, harmonious order.74 To suggest
that competing values are incommensurable (especially in the late modern context
of multiculturalism and the global clash of fanatical faiths) is to assume that different
values have equal claim to normative validity and that no hierarchical ordering can
command popular assent. In the absence of higher-order universal principles from
which particular norms derive their moral character, general values such as freedom,
equality, and security constitute their own foundation and finality.
However, no value is valuable in itself or as such, not even ancient liberties or
modern human rights. Values are valuable because they originate from an ‘invaluable’
source and because they are ordered towards an equally ‘invaluable’ end – a tran-
scendent principle that provides an intelligible account of what is valuable and how
it ought to be valued, blending the empirical with the normative. For example, the
sanctity of life and the dignity of the human person underpin the principles of
liberality like fair detention, fair trial, or habeas corpus that are central to notions of
freedom, equality, and security. Crucially, this argument shifts the focus away from
unilateral practices centred on self-interest and individual entitlements towards more
reciprocal arrangements that rest on the balance between rights and responsibilities –
what Wight called the link between ‘common interest’ and ‘common obligation’.75
74 In contemporary political thought, the thesis of incommensurable values finds perhaps its clearest
expression in the works of Isaiah Berlin, Richard Rorty, and John Gray.
75 Martin Wight, Power Politics, eds H. Bull and C. Holbraad (2nd edn, Hardmondsworth: Pelican
Books, 1986), pp. 293–4.
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Unlike the rather sterile debate on liberal values that are self-referential, the alterna-
tive that this article puts forward helps revive ‘grand theory’ by raising fundamental
questions about shared substantive ends, which exceed instrumental reason or arbi-
trary volition.
Linked to this argument about the common good is the reinvention of ‘constitu-
tional corporatism’ in a more plural guise against both market individualism and
state collectivism, in particular the principle of ‘mixed government’ and the role of
corporate bodies in both politics and the economy. Beyond Connolly’s ‘deep plural-
ism’, this non-statist corporatism diffuses sovereign power away from the institutions
of the central state and the free market by promoting the constitutional recognition
and political participation of mediating institutions such as professional associations
in both the public and the private sector, manufacturing and trading guilds, coopera-
tives, trade unions, voluntary organisations, universities, and free cities. More so
than the formalist separation of powers that ends in institutional stalemate or the
primacy of executive power, the constitutionalist principle of ‘mixed government’
can help balance the three branches while at the same time upholding the autonomy
of both individuals and corporate bodies within the free, shared social space – the
realm of civic institutions and civil society that is more primary than either the
national state or the transnational market associated with the modern secularist
settlement. This argument develops Wight’s recognition that in modernity ‘[s]over-
eignty had indeed passed to different states, by social contracts, but the original unity
of the human race survived’.76
Taken together, the common good and constitutional corporatism have far-
reaching implications for international theory. First of all, the focus on notions of
goodness and shared substantive ends can correct the mainstream IR fixation either
with instrumental relationships (such as national or international interests) or with
procedural ties (such as a commitment to common rules and institutions). A strictly
instrumental approach or procedural ethics forecloses the possibility of universal
ends that unite individuals, communities, and societies in an ordered relationship
towards the realisation of equality and freedom in conditions of security.77 Second,
the emphasis on constitutionalism serves to direct the increasingly hollow debate
away from the abstract standards of liberalism and democracy towards substantive
ideas and practices such as constitutional rule (as emphasised by Wight),78 embedded
institutions and ‘mixed government’ that can blend the power of the ‘one’ (efor
example, nation, parliament, monarchy), the ‘few’ (for example, regions, localities,
professions, or virtuous elites) and the ‘many’ (the people or the citizenry). Such an
approach can rebalance the growing power of the executive vis-a`-vis the legislature
and the judiciary and also incorporate the organised but non-state (and non-market)
components of national and global civil society.
Third, the theory and practice that links the common good to constitutionalism is
association. Ontologically, the idea of association accentuates the relational nature
and outlook of the human and social order, which translates into habits of coopera-
tion and gift-exchange (like trust or communication) involved in all forms of exchange.
76 Wight, International Theory, p. 38.
77 See, for example, Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant. Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000).
78 Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’, British Committee paper (October 1961),
published in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the
Theory of International Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 89–131.
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Association begins with the anthropological insight that over time and space, human
beings form mutual bonds and build bodies and polities with overlapping membership,
which amount to something greater than the sum of their individual parts. However,
this argument also acknowledges that such communities, corporations, and societies
require legitimate authority, political power, and civilising practices in order to strive
for the common good and mutual human flourishing. Accordingly, association
points to an ontological account of interpersonal relationships and corporate partner-
ship that are more fundamental than the states-based ontology of ‘international
society’ and the individual-based ontology of world society or world community. As
such, the alternative of association that this article puts forward is more primary
than the pluralist society of states that rests on natural anarchy and the solidarist
global community of humankind that is grounded in a rival vision of natural unity.79
Rethinking religion in international relations
Finally, seen from the perspective of association, the English School (as developed in
the work of Wight and Butterfield) gets it only half-right when it suggests that ‘a
states-system will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its
members’.80 What is underplayed is the role of religious communities in fostering
associative ties across the globe. Transnational links among members of the same
faith have created bonds even as they are embedded in local communities and over-
seas diasporas alike. Religious transnationalism has been an integral part of history
since the Axial Age and existed long before modern international relations. Perhaps
more so than other traditions, different world religions alert us to the existence of a
social order that precedes and underpins the modern system of national states and
transnational markets, which have become increasingly disembedded from the religious
practices, cultural habits and social ties within and across nations. Among the ideas
and practices that unite societies nationally and internationally, the flow of religions
and religiously framed cultural customs is what most of all integrates individuals into
a global community and nations into a global polity.
Such associative models are of course not limited to religious believers. On the
contrary, modes of association and corporation constitute neighbourhoods, com-
munities, cities, regions, and states. The possibility of a global public square is linked
to the idea that national states are more like ‘super-regions’ within a wider inter-
national polity – a subsidiary federation or confederation of nations rather than a
centralised super-state or a simple free-trade area. A corporate polity is something
like a ‘nested’, interlocking union of various levels of association, which seeks to
embed politics and the economy in civic bonds, social relations, cultural habits, and
79 Since Hedley Bull’s ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, in Butterfield and Wight, Diplo-
matic Investigations, pp. 51–73, some of the most important interventions in the recent debate include
Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Pluralist and Solidarity Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on
Humanitarian Intervention’, Millennium, 21:3 (1992), pp. 463–87; Chris Brown, ‘International Theory
and International Society: The Viability of the Middle Way?’, Review of International Studies, 21:2
(1995), pp. 183–96; Jackson, Global Covenant; Barry Buzan, From International to World Society?
English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), chaps 5 and 8; Jens Bartelson, Visions of World Community (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2009).
80 Wight, Systems of States, p. 33.
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religious practices. These ties embody principles of reciprocity and mutuality that are
upheld by different religious and non-religious traditions. Thus, one effect of the
global religious resurgence is to promote forms of corporate association among
nations and peoples that are beyond the modern dualistic divide between the reli-
gious and the secular on which mainstream IR theory rests.
Conclusion
This article has argued that notions of post-secularity do not advance the debate on
religion in international relations. To speak of the post-secular assumes already that
we know what the secular is. By contrast with existing accounts, the article contends
that secularism is not limited to the public settlement of the relationship between
faith and politics or the functional differentiation of religious from political authority.
Instead, secularism rests on the modern invention of the category of ‘religion’ and on
the de-sacralisation and re-sacralisation of the public square by investing the secular
space with quasi-sacred significance. By operating a secular capture of the sacred and
bracketing religion out of the picture, secularism forecloses the possibility that im-
manent values might have a transcendent origin and finality.
This article has also showed that the concept of the post-secular remains wedded
to the logic of secularism. First, post-secularity views reason as essentially secular
and religious faith as irrational or arational. Second, post-secular thinking has a
tendency to elevate difference into the sole transcendental term, which either sacralises
difference and views alterity in quasi-sacred terms or seeks to convert the ‘other’ into
the ‘same’ by imposing categories such as negative liberty or emancipation on cul-
tures worldwide. Third, theorists of the post-secular such as Habermas or Connolly
wrongly equate secular modernity with metaphysical universalism, which they seek
to replace with post-metaphysical pluralism. Finally, post-secularity proclaims the
‘end of metaphysics’, which precludes a transcendent ontology that can challenge the
secularist bias of mainstream IR traditions and reverse the decline of grand theory.
The alternative that this article outlines is an international theory, which develops
the Christian realism of the English School in the direction of a metaphysical-political
realism. Such a realism can theorise the link between metaphysics and international
theory, provide a synthesis of reason and faith as well as develop the notion of a
‘corporate association’ of peoples and nations that are bound together by the flow
of ideas and practices embodied in religions, customs, and traditions rather than
abstract rights or commercial contracts. Realism so configured can rethink religion
in international affairs and help revive grand theory in IR.
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